Environmental Pragmatism [preprint] by Fesmire, Steven
Environmental Pragmatism 
 
1707 words (main text)  
 
Abstract: Environmental pragmatists argue that it is defeatist to declare in 
advance that the only effective way to deal with environmental problems is 
to usher in a complete cultural paradigm shift that radically transforms 
human value systems. Hence, they do not place a high priority on 
revolutionary attempts to convince doubters that natural systems, 
living beings, or sentient beings have intrinsic value. Instead, they prioritize 
creating a democratic context for adaptive decision processes, which of 
course includes the evaluation of vying principles. This approach reflects 
John Dewey’s distinction between a planning society and a planned 
society. Whereas incommensurable values are an inherent problem for any 
planned society, such as Plato’s Republic or the former Soviet Union, they 
are irreducible frictions within a planning society. This focus on planning is 
illustrated by pragmatist philosopher Andrew Light’s work on climate 
diplomacy as U.S. Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Affairs. 
The Kyoto Protocol began with an abstract principle of equitable emissions. 
But its top-down, punitive approach precipitated a race to the bottom when 
it came to agreeing on binding targets. In contrast, the Paris Agreement’s 
bottom-up “pledge and review” approach fronts adaptive processes through 
which countries intra-nationally decide what to do, take stock, and 
reconvene to pressure each other. Such continuous cooperative planning 
makes it more likely that evolving situations will be met creatively and with 
higher ambition.  
 
 
In their edited volume Environmental Pragmatism (1996), Light and 
Katz define environmental pragmatism as “the open-ended inquiry into 
specific real-life problems of humanity’s relationship with the environment” 
(2). According to Franks et al., environmental pragmatism is “an approach 
to environmental ethics that emphasizes the need for environmental 
activists and academics to open-mindedly engage with people’s existing 
environmental attitudes and behaviors if they are to have any influence 
over them” (2017, 13). These definitions are accurate as far as they go, but 
more should be said to distinguish environmental pragmatism from other 
approaches and to clarify what is meant by “open-ended inquiry” and 
“open-minded engagement.”  
Environmental pragmatists are ethical naturalists. That is, they argue 
that we can deal intelligently with problems and direct ourselves toward 
desirable goals without transcendental standards or a priori deductions that 
hide from inspection even as they pretend to guarantee the validity of 
judgments. They are also strong pluralists, who affirm multiple values that 
cannot be reduced to a single value. Hence, they are not ethical monists, 
who appeal to a supreme moral principle, value, standard, law, concept, or 
ideal that foreshortens whatever is morally relevant in a situation. 
Pragmatists have long regarded the old quest in moral theory for the single 
central and basic source of normative justification as outdated. The moral 
theorist’s job, pragmatically understood, is to systematically work through, 
generalize, and guide inquiry into situations in which the way forward is not 
well lit, when multiple paths beckon, and when incompatible goods, 
colliding duties, and competing virtues are at cross purposes with each 
other.  
Accordingly, a standout feature of environmental pragmatism is 
rejection of the mainstream attempt in environmental ethics to find a single 
defensible paradigm with which we must align ourselves. Monistic 
standpoints are not dismissed, but they are recast as tools to open up 
inquiry, thereby compensating for their tendency to be unidimensional. 
They are at least a counterweight to a do-nothing attitude. Nevertheless, 
whatever their own philosophies of nature, pragmatist environmental 
ethicists do not place a high priority on revolutionary attempts to convince 
doubters that natural systems, living beings, or sentient beings have 
intrinsic value. Instead, they tend to focus more than monists on 
ameliorative processes for resolving disagreements and on making 
workable, ecologically informed decisions. Without staking out an 
anthropocentric, sentientist, biocentric, or ecocentric position in the 
foundational values debate that has typified environmental and animal 
ethics since the 1970s, environmental pragmatists struggle to create a 
democratic context for adaptive decision processes. These cooperative 
processes are informed not only by well-vetted principles, but also by wise 
ecological perception of the complex nature of problems such as climate 
change and other anthropogenic drivers of rapid global disruption. 
Their rejection of the monistic quest clarifies the sense in which 
environmental pragmatism is an “open-ended” approach to making better 
moral and political decisions that bear on situations that implicate humans 
and the rest of nature. Some representatives include Norton (1991, 2015), 
Weston (1991), Minteer (2011), Thompson (2015), Light (2017), Fesmire 
(2020), and McKenna (2020). 
Self-identified pragmatists may or may not additionally concur with 
the strong version of Norton’s “convergence hypothesis” (1991) that broad-
scope anthropocentric arguments usually justify the same policies as 
ecocentric arguments. But they agree with Norton that it is defeatist to 
declare in advance that the only effective way to deal with our most urgent 
environmental problems is to usher in a complete cultural paradigm shift 
that radically transforms human value systems. On the pragmatist view, we 
do not generate much general willingness to act together when we insist 
that others first convert to our value framework. This is not always 
avoidable, as with the history of Jim Crow segregation in the U.S., but the 
pragmatist urges democratic colloquy to go as far as it can instead of 
starting from an ideal standpoint that autocratically sidelines discord and 
dissent. For this reason, environmental pragmatists hypothesize with 
Norton that, so long as our view of human interests is suitably long term 
and ecologically contextualized, it may motivate policies that converge with 
those that would be adopted by reasonable environmental theorists despite 
their conflicting values.  
Norton’s hypothesis applies to what pragmatist philosopher John 
Dewey (1859-1952) called a planning society rather than a planned society. 
“There is a difference between a society which is planned and a society 
which is continuously planning—namely, the difference between autocracy 
and democracy, between dogma and intelligence in operation, between 
suppression of individuality and that release and utilization of individuality 
which will bring it to full maturity” (1933, 76). Whereas incommensurable 
values across individuals, groups, and countries are an inherent problem 
for any planned society, such as Plato’s Republic or the former Soviet 
Union, these values are irreducible frictional factors of a continuously 
planning society. 
This focus on planning through adaptive and generative decision 
processes may be clarified by contrasting the Kyoto Protocol with the Paris 
Climate Agreement. The Paris Agreement illustrates cooperative planning 
across the incommensurable values of diverse communities. At risk of 
oversimplification, the Kyoto Protocol took a top-down, punitive approach 
tethered to an abstract principle of equitable emissions. According to Light 
(2017), who was confirmed in 2021 as U.S. Assistant Secretary of Energy 
for International Affairs, by emphasizing ends fixed in advance, with 
penalties attached, Kyoto precipitated a race to the bottom when it came to 
agreeing on binding targets. In contrast, the Paris Agreement took a 
bottom-up, “pledge and review” approach (aka “shame and blame”), which 
Light regards as exemplifying a pragmatic emphasis on adaptive action, 
making it more likely that evolving situations will be met creatively and with 
higher ambition.  
As a model for climate diplomacy, Light thus focuses pragmatically on 
a decision process to elicit the generative possibilities of an international 
community shackled by an overly legalistic approach that was insensitive to 
seemingly intractable tensions, no matter how equitable it was in the 
abstract. Light adds that Paris is ameliorative and encourages the 
celebration of intermediate progress as part of five-year plans in which 
countries convene (beginning November 2021), report out, and pressure 
each other to be more ambitious. In this way, unlike the planned Kyoto 
Protocol, Paris can strategically navigate discordant values as long as 
countries keep planning together.  
Light, like Dewey, concurs that there must be quasi-definite, albeit 
revisable, agreed-upon goals to focus our ambitions. But both reject the 
two most influential variations of the misguided quest for an absolute 
standard by which to measure progress: (1) the juvenile notion that 
progress “means a definite sum of accomplishment which will forever stay 
done, and which by an exact amount lessens the amount still to be done … 
on our road to a final stable and unperplexed goal,” and (2) the popular 
though foolishly pessimistic notion that all achievements are negligible in 
comparison to ultimate and perfect goods (Dewey 1922, 197-198). 
Norton (2015) clarifies this pragmatist approach to decision making, 
planning, and goal-setting in the playful spirit of Isaiah Berlin’s “The 
Hedgehog and the Fox” (1953), with a binary heuristic that would amount to 
caricature if applied in toto to any individual moral or political theorist. There 
are two kinds of intellectuals, Berlin proposed in his tongue-in-cheek riff on 
Archilochus: monistic hedgehogs and pluralistic foxes. He contrasted the 
“centripetal” (centralized) actions and ideas of the hedgehog with the 
“centrifugal” (decentralized) ones of the protean fox. Norton picks up the 
image here. The monistic hedgehog asserts that its job as a theorist is to 
show which antecedently defended, (relatively) static principles should 
govern choice. So the incorrigible hedgehog focuses first on getting the 
theory all worked out and then impersonally deciding whose values 
measure up to its supreme or “optimal” metric. Start with getting the theory 
right, and the rest follows! Meanwhile, the participatory fox, at home in 
wickedly complex systems and spotlighting the fallibility and 
incompleteness of any decision or policy, attends to adaptive processes 
through which we may interpersonally or intra-nationally decide what to do, 
listen, pursue creative leads, take stock, critique choices, and correct our 
mistakes. 
 Returning to climate diplomacy as an example of environmental 
pragmatism at work, hedgehog processes (akin to Kyoto) are expert-
governed to predetermine a metric that will yield the right, optimal, or ideal 
outcome. Meanwhile, foxlike processes (akin to Paris) strive to engage 
communities or their proxies in what Norton characterizes as Deweyan 
“social learning,” which Norton (2015) understands as a scientifically 
informed procedural feedback loop for intelligently adapting policies to 
situations by incorporating representative stakeholders. Foxlike processes 
may thereby increase ambition toward achieving superordinate goals and, 
at least potentially, foster growth in the public imagination as both means 
and end.  
There are promising signs that Paris’s “foxlike” pledge-and-review 
approach to one-upmanship among countries is working, and is moreover 
helping to scale up public-private partnerships that will be required to 
radically reconstruct markets. The April 2021 Earth Day international 
climate summit hosted by U.S. President Biden was distinguished by 
countries boasting about their accomplishments and green economy 
innovations (e.g., carbon pricing). Countries competed with each other’s 
greenhouse emission targets to mitigate climate change, and there was 
unrelenting pressure placed on wealthy nations to increase their financial 
commitments to climate justice to help poorer countries adapt. “The theme 
of this conference is raising ambition,” said U.S. Climate Envoy John Kerry 
in his wrap-up to the first session, and “raising ambition” was indeed the 
leitmotif used throughout by heads of state, NGOs, and corporate 
executives. For example, French President Macron announced at that 
conference that “2030 is the new 2050” for achieving the agreed-upon goal 
of net-zero carbon emissions, positioning France ahead of Germany in its 
goals, even as German Chancellor Merkel announced 55% reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, thereby outpacing President Biden’s 
relatively aggressive new target of halving U.S. emissions by the same 
date.   
Environmental pragmatists’ emphasis on continuous cooperative 
planning does not imply that they sidestep the evaluation of principles. For 
example, there are tensions between the precautionary principle and 
welfare-based cost-benefit analyses, and there are debates in climate 
ethics underlying the discount rate. It is perilous to ignore principles, not 
least because this undemocratically leave the consequences of following 
divergent principles solely to those with technical expertise. Nevertheless, 
pragmatists focus less on debates about which general principles are the 
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